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Panel III: Restructuring Professional
Sports Leagues
Moderator: Martin Edel1
Panelists:
Jamin Dershowitz2
Jeffrey Kessler3
Tandy O’Donoghue4
Kenneth Shropshire5
MS. COHEN: Our third and final panel is “Restructuring
Professional Sports Leagues.” I will provide you with a brief
summary.
With the exception of baseball for certain subjects,6 all sports
leagues must adhere to the requirements of section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.7 Baseball is one sport that has been immune from
antitrust scrutiny since the holding of Federal Baseball Club v.
The way professional sports leagues are
National League.8
structured can determine whether or not a professional sports league
will be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
The founders of Major League Soccer (hereinafter “MLS”)
developed their league as a single entity. On April 19, 2000, in
1

Partner, Miller & Wrubel P.C. B.A., Columbia College, 1972; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1975.
2
General Counsel, Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA). B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1985; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988.
3
Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. B.A., Columbia College, 1975; J.D.,
Columbia Law School, 1977.
4
Associate, Proskauer Rose LLP. B.S., Cornell University, 1994; J.D., Tulane
University School of Law, 1997.
5
Professor and Chairperson of Legal Studies, Wharton School of Business, University
of Pennsylvania. B.A., Stanford University, 1977; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1980.
6
See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc.,
346 U.S. 356 (1953) (affirming baseball’s exemption from federal antitrust regulation).
7
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2001).
8
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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deciding the case of Fraser v. Major League Soccer L.L.C.,9 Judge
O’Toole of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that as a single entity, Major League Soccer
could not violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10
Our panelists will address the various factors affecting the league’s
existence as a single entity, as well as the added responsibilities that
must be undertaken by a single entity in the negotiation of media and
player contracts.
Our third and final panel will be moderated by Mr. Martin Edel.
Mr. Edel is a Partner at Miller & Wrubel. He is also an Adjunct
Associate Professor of Sports Law at Brooklyn Law School. In
1999, he became the Chairperson of the Sports Law Committee for
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and was also a
member of the Association’s Antitrust Law Committee.
Mr. Edel is a member of the New York State and American Bar
Associations. From 1975 until 1978 he was an Associate at Cravath,
Swaine & Moore.
Mr. Edel received his B.A. from Columbia College in 1972,
Summa Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa. In 1975, he received his
Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School, where he earned the Boykin
C. Wright Award and was an Editor of the Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review.
And now, on to our third and final panel, Mr. Edel.
MR. EDEL: Thank you, Jessica. I hadn’t remembered half of my
biography, so I was glad that you could refresh my recollection with
it.
We have today what I think is one of the showcase programs of
this or any other symposium, which is the concept of restructuring
sports leagues. That is a bit of a misnomer, because I am not aware
of any league that has been restructured. What we have had, though,
in the past decade is a number of new leagues that have come into
existence that have adopted a new structure, sometimes called the
9
10

97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).
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single-entity structure, because of advantages that the league
perceives it has in terms of player relations, dealing with the media,
dealing with vendors, and sometimes even dealing among the
investors, who were formerly known as owners.
I am particularly delighted to moderate this panel because we have
such a very outstanding panel for you this afternoon. All of the
people on our panel—and this is sort of an all-star grouping of
panelists who we have here today—have written, argued, or lived
through the single-entity concept in some detail.
I will just spend a moment or two reflecting on what the singleentity concept is. It is a concept that was rejected by the courts in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but began to receive some grudging
acceptance at the beginning of the 1990s, particularly by the Seventh
Circuit in the Chicago Bulls11 case, and has become the new model
for, I think, all new sports leagues that have come into existence
since the mid- or early 1990s.
More recently, as you heard Jessica talk about, in Boston, Judge
O’Toole approved the format of a single-entity league and its
immunity from section 1 of the Sherman Act because, as I am sure
all of you remember from reading section 1 of the Sherman Act, as a
single entity, you lack at least two entities and, therefore, there can
be no contract, combination, or conspiracy in unlawful restraint of
trade.12
Why would a league move to a single-entity model? We will hear
some discussion from the panel and we will be able to take your
questions on it later.
Just as a brief overview, one, of course, is to insulate the leagues
from antitrust liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act. There is
still the question of section 2, which Judge O’Toole did not address
in his decision but was the subject of a ten-week trial this past fall

11

Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that the NBA might be a single entity for some purposes and not for others).
12
Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130.
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and winter.13 We have two participants on our panel who were
engaged in that trial.
There is the question of unity of interests among the investors in
the league: How they can deal with vendors in securing better
contracts, if that is possible; and how they can deal with the media in
the same way. In terms of player relations, have we tilted the
playing field by removing the antitrust weapon from the players
under the single-entity model? Is the single-entity model a viable
way of proceeding?
I will leave that to the panel, and you will hear from the panel the
enormous consequences of shifting from what has been called the
traditional model to a single-entity model.
We have a very distinguished panel. Let me spend a few moments
introducing them. I had the pleasure, last night and this morning, of
going through everyone’s biography and résumé. If I sat here and
read them to you, we would probably spend at least the next two
hours with listening to their achievements. I will forbear and try to
give a quick summary of each of the achievements of our four
panelists.
Our first speaker today will be Kenneth Shropshire. Ken is a
Professor and Department Chairman at the Wharton School at the
University of Pennsylvania. He is also a sports industry consultant,
speaker, and author of several award-winning books, including
Agents of Opportunity: Sports Agents and Corruption in Collegiate
Sports; The Sports Franchise Game: Cities in Pursuit of Sports
Franchises, Events, Stadiums, and Arenas; In Black and White: Race
and Sports in America; Sports and the Law: A Modern Anthology;
and, more recently, Basketball Jones: America Above the Rim.
Ken also authors columns in various media publications, has been
a commentator on TV and radio, and has his own web site.14 Ken
was also Program Chairman for the American Bar Association
Section on Sports Law. Ken graduated from Stanford. And, lest I
13
14

2002).

Id.
See Kenneth Shropshire, at http://www.kennethshropshire.com (last visited Jan. 5,
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forget, he also has some local roots here; he did attend the law school
that is just north of Fordham.
We are very fortunate to have Ken here today. He will present an
overview for us on the topic of league structuring and its economic
implications, focusing on why there is a movement towards
restructuring or structuring of professional sports leagues and the
implications for antitrust, intellectual property, and other concerns.
Our second speaker is Tandy O’Donoghue. Tandy is an Associate
with the firm of Proskauer Rose here in New York. She works in the
firm’s Litigation and Dispute Resolution Department. She has
worked for Proskauer’s clients in the sports industry, including
Major League Soccer, which she will talk about at some length, the
National Hockey League (hereinafter “NHL”), the National
Basketball Association (hereinafter “NBA”), the Philadelphia Eagles,
and the ATP Tour. Tandy recently spent a number of months in
Boston, where Proskauer Rose defended Major League Soccer in the
antitrust case to which Jessica referred and I talked about a few
moments ago.
Tandy graduated from Cornell University and received her Juris
Doctor in 1997, magna cum laude, from Tulane University School of
Law, where she was a Senior Associate Editor of the Tulane Law
Review.
Tandy will address from the legal perspective why the singleentity structure is attractive to new and emerging leagues. She will
focus on the recent Major League Soccer case in Boston, where
Judge O’Toole granted summary judgment in favor of Major League
Soccer on the single-entity section 1 Sherman Act issue.15
Our third speaker will be Jeffrey Kessler. Jeff is the “go-to”
person for all league player issues. If the players have a concern,
they will go to Jeff Kessler. Jeff is a Partner at the firm of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges in New York. For those of you who have read
any player issues, the media inevitably seems to quote Jeff, who
usually obliges. He has been involved in virtually every major sports
antitrust and labor law issue over the past decade. In terms of his
15

See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130.
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other achievements, he also concentrates in the area of antitrust law,
and trade regulation; he has litigated complex sports antitrust cases
and other antitrust cases during his illustrious career at Weil,
Gotshal, which is continuing—I do not mean to make this sound like
it is the end of your career, Jeff.
MR. KESSLER: I feel like the casket should be opened at this
point.
MR. EDEL: Some of the sports law cases that Jeff has worked on
are the Freeman McNeil free agency trial,16 the Reggie White case,17
the Junior Bridgeman case,18 and the Fraser case involving Major
League Soccer in Boston.19
Jeff is a member of the American Bar Association Antitrust
Section; he is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham University
School of Law; and he is a Founding Member of the Board of
Advisors of the Georgetown University Study of Private Antitrust
Litigation. He has written and lectured extensively on a wide variety
of antitrust, sports, and related topics. Jeff graduated from Columbia
College and from Columbia Law School, where he was a Kent
Scholar and Editor of the Columbia Law Review.
Jeff will also address the issue of the single-entity structure as
reflected principally in the Major League Soccer case. Not
surprisingly, he will come out with a different perspective from
Tandy’s, and it should be very interesting to the point-counterpoint
that we have and the sparks that may fly there.
Our fourth speaker, and our clean-up hitter today, is Jamin
Dershowitz. Jamin is General Counsel of the Women’s National
Basketball Association (hereinafter “WNBA”) and Assistant General
Counsel of the NBA. As you may know or may not know, the
WNBA is structured as a single-entity league.
16

Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D. Minn. 1991)
(holding that the labor exemption had ended because the National Football League Players
Association had decertified).
17
White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993).
18
Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (re: Chris Dudley), 838 F. Supp. 172 (D.N.J.
1993).
19
See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130.
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Jamin graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and from
Yale Law School. He clerked for Judge Joseph Tauro, worked with
the Legal Aid Society, and segued quite naturally from there into
working for the NBA.
Jamin will discuss today some of the practical issues involved in
being a single-entity league. As a practitioner, he will focus on the
day-to-day issues and how they differ in a single-entity league from
that which we see in a more traditional model, such as you might
think about from the National Football League (hereinafter “NFL”),
Major League Baseball (hereinafter “MLB”), the NBA, or the
National Hockey League.
I am now delighted to turn over, and stop speaking for a change,
the program to Ken Shropshire.
MR. SHROPSHIRE: Good Afternoon. It is good to see some
former students here today. I will try not to cover old territory.
I will do a quick overview of league structures, historically and
currently. Although I won’t detail the inner workings of the singleentity structure, I will try to introduce some of its attributes and
flaws, so that the later speakers can elaborate. What I will try to tie
in are some of the business reasons why the single-entity structure is
being looked to so much.
Many of you know that originally sports in America, especially the
team sports, started off as individual clubs.20 You have stories of
George Halas sitting around with the rest of the football team,
passing the hat around after games to collect funds to divide amongst
the team.21 At the heart of that is the thought that we started off with
individual and independent clubs that eventually got together and
said, “Hey, we should come together with a plan, a schedule,
20
See, e.g., Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The
Commissioner and an Alternate Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 65, 66 (1995).
21
For a brief biography of Halas, see Real Men: George Halas, at
http://www.manlyweb.com/realmen/GeorgeHalas.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2002). While
he may not have passed his trademark hat into the crowd to collect money, Halas was the
founder, owner, and a player for the Chicago Bears, and was one of the leading forces
behind the creation and development of the NFL.
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organize, and become a league.” So it was the teams that formed the
leagues. Sometimes we lose track of that, but it was the leagues that
were created to direct the success of the individual teams.
Many legal scholars, and those of you taking sports law courses,
have trouble or point out the trouble of trying to define what kind of
legal structure a sports league is.22 Is it a corporation? What is this
thing? How do you view this thing and how do you deal with it?
That issue is certainly at the heart of the problems that are there in
the cases that have tried to figure out if the single-entity defense is
valid.23 What we began to see was the law of private associations
being applied to determine how these leagues should operate, how
they should run, and how the law should address them.24 If you go
back and look at this stuff, you will see an old Harvard Law Review
article, entitled “Private Associations,” that many people point to as
the crux of how to define these leagues legally.25
If you look for when these problems began and when this whole
idea of restructuring came to bear on these leagues, it is relatively
recent. If you look at the initial sports law hornbooks, such as the
Weistart and Lowell book,26 or Lionel Sobel’s book from the
1970s,27 you see there a theoretical conversation about what happens
when individual teams and the league start fighting. There was very
little guidance from the case law until we got beyond that period.
The key distinction that you see in these discussions though,
between private associations and sports leagues is the emergence of
the commissioner, as opposed to the leadership within a private
22

For a sampling of the various views of a sports league’s legal status, see Thane N.
Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging
Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729 (1987); Michael S. Jacobs,
Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the
Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991).
23
For discussion, see generally Brad McChesney, Professional Sports Leagues and the
Single Entity Defense, 6 SPORTS LAW. J. 125 (1999) (discussing various sports leagues have
claimed to be single entities in order to defend against charges of antitrust liability).
24
See Lentze, supra note 20, at 76.
25
Note, Development in the Law—Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1963).
26
JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL C., THE LAW OF SPORTS (1979).
27
LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW (1977).
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association, and the way that the courts began to treat the
commissioner in these settings.28
There were a couple of sidebar events where property law came
into play and where there was an argument that whenever the
commissioner or league would take action, they were doing some
harm or taking property from the team for a short period of time.29
That kind of discussion was the precursor for some of the decisions
that we see today, including the Raiders decisions.30
It became clear that the heart of how a league operates and how the
courts will view a league is based largely on the respective league’s
constitution and bylaws.31 The courts said to the leagues, “Look, the
way we want to treat you is how you want to treat yourself. You set
forth the rules and guidelines as with any other private association,
and then we will know how to deal with you in the way that we
should treat you.”
We began to see, in Finley v. Kuhn,32 that the court is trying to
figure out what the commissioner did in negating the sale by Finley.
The court said it was not whether Commissioner Kuhn was wise in
voiding the trade, but whether he had the authority. That became
what the courts continually tried to look at to decide whether or not
there was authority present.33
Just prior to that case, if you think about the economics, the
biggest economic influx in sports was television in the 1950s34 and
28

See Lentze, supra note 20, at 69-79.
See Note, supra note 25, at 998.
30
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1986); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984).
31
See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 795 (stating that “[t]he implications drawn from
early case law suggest that so long as a league rule is incorporated into a collective
bargaining agreement, after being subject to meaningful arms length negotiation between
the relevant parties, the nonstatutory labor exemption should immunize a league from
antitrust liability.”).
32
Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
33
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 568-69 (9th
Cir. 1987).
34
See Brett T. Goodman, The Sports Broadcasting Act: As Anachronistic as the
Dumont Network?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 469, 471-72 (1995). Though the first
televised sporting event in America, a college baseball game, occurred in 1939, professional
29
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with it came a need for a greater level of cooperation among the
teams in order to be successful in the television market.35 This was
what was contemplated at the time: “Let’s negotiate these TV
contracts as a group rather than as individual franchises and we will
be able to gain more from the networks.” This was certainly the
basis of discussion in the United States v. National Football
League36 case in the early 1950s, and certainly why we see the
evolution of the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.37
These set the stage for courts trying to figure out, in the late 1960s
and early 1970s what a league is, and, more importantly, the big
battle of whether or not antitrust law should apply to sports
leagues—specifically whether or not this is the type of enterprise that
is subject to scrutiny under section 138 and section 239.
The biggest focus on this that we have seen in recent years which
turned the corner in thinking about this, were the Raiders relocation
cases, involving Al Davis and the Raiders, in the late 1970s and early
1980s.40 This is where the single-entity defense41 becomes the shield
that the leagues look to say to courts, “Wait a minute, they’re one of
us. We’re all the same. How can you possibly say that we are
violating the antitrust laws when we are just a single entity? That
cannot be and we should not allow that to happen.” Similar issues
emerged in other cases at that time, in the relocations of the San
Diego Clippers42 and others,43 and you saw a freezing of league
sports did not gain major exposure from the networks until the 1950s. Id.
35
See Lentze, supra note 20, at 66.
36
116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
37
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961). This act is an exemption from antitrust laws for agreements
covering the telecasting of sports contests and the combining of professional football
leagues.
38
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits agreements or
conspiracies among competitors that have an anticompetitive effect on the market.
39
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001). Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits actions taken to gain or
maintain a monopoly.
40
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1986); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984).
41
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
42
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
43
The Baltimore Colts and the Arizona Cardinals were among the NFL teams
that relocated in the aftermath of the Raiders decisions.
See Jack Clary,
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actions occur as the Raiders successfully got a judgment against the
NFL in that case.44
So as this begins to develop, I think it also becomes clear that the
single-entity defense may be helpful in some labor settings as well.
From the business standpoint against teams, and from the labor
standpoint against players, it becomes in the league’s best interests to
figure out a way to be viewed as a single entity.
As many franchises were going through transformations, a
statement that highlights some of the business issues of the time is
O’Malley’s statement about why he decided to sell the Dodgers to
Murdoch and Fox.45 Basically, he said that you need a broader
financial base than an individual family to carry you through the
storm, that you’ve got to find a way to make the smaller enterprises
work within a group, and that sports are becoming entertainment, a
different business from that of George Halas’s time.
Certainly, we have seen different owners step up and act counter to
broader league interests. Apart from Al Davis, you saw Jerry Jones
of the Dallas Cowboys take individual actions for the benefit of his
team46 that were not necessarily in line with what David Harris
described as “league-think” in his book The League.47 Basically,
Jones’s actions were not in line with what was best overall for the
league.
Many people looking at this said, “Well, let’s look as if we are
going to start a new league, which we have seen enough of in recent
years, what is the best way to structure it? How should we do it to
avoid the problems that we have seen regarding labor, the problems
The Third 25, THE COFFIN CORNER, Vol. XVI (1994), available at
http://www.footballresearch.com/articles/frpage.cfm?topic=seas-25c (last visited Jan. 5,
2002).
44
See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1359
(9th Cir. 1986).
45
See The Official Website of the Los Angeles Dodgers, History, Timeline, 1990’s, at
http://dodgers.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/la/history/la_history_timeline_article.jsp?article=11
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002). On March 19, 1998 the FOX Group officially took over the team
from the O’Malley family that had owned the team for over fifty years.
46
Nat’l Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 922 F.
Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
47
DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL (1986).
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we have seen regarding antitrust, and also to move forward more
rapidly to take advantage of the entertainment-type synergy, and also
make quicker decisions about those opportunities?”
The classic strategy analysis of a sports model for success would
take you through a few different elements. Let me highlight some
and then close with a couple of thoughts.
The first element, as Martin mentioned, is certainly the financing
to get these enterprises funded. Most problematic for the singleentity structure is figuring out how to tell the large-ego set of owners
that this league is going to be a little bit different and that as a single
entity, one of the owners, like George Steinbrenner48 or Jerry Buss,49
will not have the opportunity to be out front in the same manner that
previous leagues have had individual owners out front.
The next element is the control. If you are the commissioner, the
president or head of the league, you do not have to go to twenty-nine
or thirty owners and say, “What is it that we should do?” With the
single-entity structure, decisions can be made in more of a
centralized manner.50 At various times and in various leagues, it can
be said that some commissioners have had more of that kind of
power than others.51 And certainly, in Major League Baseball, the
Bud Selig model is probably as far away as you can get from an
individual who is in charge, and more often it is the owners who
come together to make league decisions.52
The third element relates to the product on the field that is
produced by the traditional model versus this new single-entity
48

George Steinbrenner is the majority owner of the New York Yankees
baseball team, and one of the most influential and well-known team owners in
Major League Baseball. See The Official Website of the New York Yankees, at
http://yankees.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/nyy/team/nyy_frontoffice_dir.jsp?club_context=nyy
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
49
Dr. Jerry Buss is the owner of the Los Angeles Lakers basketball team, and like
Steinbrenner in baseball, is a prominent team owner in the National Basketball Association.
For a history of the Lakers franchise and a chronicle of their success, see Lakers History, at
http://www.nba.com/lakers/history/history.html#18 (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
50
See McChesney, supra note 23, at 142-43. The author compares the solidarity of
purpose and interest in MLS, with the intraleague squabbles that one sees in other leagues.
51
See Lentze, supra note 20, at 71.
52
See id. at 80-81.
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concept. How much control does the league have over the quality of
the gameplay? I mean, when you think about this like any other
consumer product, do you have more control if what you put out
there is the result of centralization? Think of the XFL and the
product that is there, whether you like the league or not, there is
uniformity in the way the league and teams look. This element also
allows the league to take care of the large-market/small-market
problems that we are seeing in baseball and basketball.53 If it is all
centralized, it is easier to take care of than trying to put the pressure
on the teams themselves.
The next element concerns the marketing problems that may arise.
The key marketing element in sports is consumer confidence that this
is a valid and fair competition, and that there is no advantage to any
individual franchise.54 Again, the single-entity model can be
confusing, in that you do not have the traditional competitive
elements of owner against owner.55 And if combined with that you
lack a strong commissioner, if you don’t have the white-swathed hair
of Commissioner Landis56 to say everything is okay, then the
problem gets even deeper.
The final element concerns the legal issues and the benefits that
come from the single-entity structure. It is not clearly defined yet. It
is not clear that this entity escapes antitrust scrutiny. As we
mentioned, section 2 still lays out there, and section 1 possibly still
exists.57 And remember, there is a difference between antitrust
actions by players as opposed to those by other teams or even upstart
leagues.58 If other leagues come into play, particularly with regard to
section 2, how valid is the single-entity defense going to be in that
type of setting?
53

See, e.g., Dan Lewis, It Happens Every Spring, REASON ONLINE (2001), at
http://www.reason.com/0105/co.dl.it.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
54
See Lentze, supra note 20, at 70. Public confidence in baseball dropped dramatically
after the “Black Sox Scandal,” involving the fixing of the 1919 World Series, leading to the
installation of the near-omnipotent Commissioner Landis.
55
See McChesney, supra note 23, at 142-44.
56
For a short biography of Landis, see Kenesaw Mountain Landis (1866-1944), at
http://www.inficad.com/~ksup/landis.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
57
See McChesney, supra note 23, at 141-45.
58
See id. at 127-33. Suits brought by players under antitrust grounds may succeed
whereas suits by other teams or other leagues may not pierce the single-entity defense.
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Based on the full analysis of this single entity, if you think of the
WNBA, MLS, and the XFL, people say that notwithstanding the
financing problems, the lack of legal confidence, and certain
marketing concerns, that this is a model to try. That is why we have
seen sports going forward in that direction.
We have seen some restructuring, particularly with MLS. “Can
we really get funds in by giving owners no kind of Steinbrenneresque face time?” But they have addressed this and been trying to
make it work better.
In the end, regarding restructuring, I don’t think we are wherever
we are going to be, and I do not think that we will see any
unstructuring of any of the major sports, but we will see a different
structure for the newer emerging sports, particularly as some of these
upstart leagues go by the wayside and others come up in their place.
Let me stop at that and let others talk about what is next.
MS. O’DONOGHUE: Let me ask everybody to step back for a
second and, instead of focusing on the antitrust element of a league’s
structure, think about some of the general difficulties that a new
league or any new business will face. There are always antitrust
concerns, but separate and apart from that, I think that a fundamental
issue that new leagues have to consider is the competitive
environment they are coming into and how to ensure their success in
that environment.
Besides dealing with a competitive environment, MLS is coming
into an environment where soccer has failed miserably in the past
and the League wants to avoid its predecessors’ mistakes.59 There
are also the issues of wanting to avoid the pitfalls that other leagues
have faced in the legal arena, including the antitrust pitfalls.60
But if we just look at a start-up business generally and look at a
league generally and what it needs to do to maximize its revenue, the
single-entity structure gives the league the ability to give those who
59

See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132 (D. Mass. 2000)
(discussing the failure of other soccer leagues).
60
See generally Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593
(7th Cir. 1996); L.A. Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
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invest in this league—the actual investors in the league, its sponsors,
its television partners, or its marketing partners—a degree of
certainty that does not necessarily exist in other structures.61 This
certainty has value in it. So I think that new leagues are in a position
where they need to capitalize on every piece of value out there, and
the single-entity structure allows them to do that.62
If we look at another league, such as the National Football League,
the NFL has the ability to take the intellectual property associated
with it and all of its clubs and package that for its sponsors and its
television partners. But it is able to do that in a different way than an
entity like Major League Soccer. It is able to do that because it
secured the right to do that from the clubs.63
In a single entity like MLS, the intellectual property rights, for
example, reside with the entity, they reside with the league.64 The
teams do not own anything. The teams are a part of the league. So
not only do you give yourself and your business partners the ability
to use such assets to their full advantage, but you avoid the pitfalls

61
Karen Jordan, Forming A Single Entity: A Recipe For Success For New Professional
Sports Leagues, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 235, 245, 247 (2001) (having a centralized
system of decision making in the league office shield the team owners from money
pressures which can lead to rash decisions and potentially hurt their investment); Heike K.
Sullivan, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The MLS’s Single-Entity Structure Is A “Sham”,
73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, 866 (2000) (noting that the risk-friendly nature of the MLS system
where the league has control appeals to investors because it gives them a greater chance of
survival); see also Larry Lebowitz, Sports Inc.: Leagues are Forming as ‘Single Entities’
Where Decision and Profits Are Shared By All Owners, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
Apr. 20, 1997, at 1F, available at 1997 WL 3098439 (discussing that owners see the
advantage of investing in a single entity as decreasing the risks of independent team
ownership where one owner could spend out of control and put the other team out of
business).
62
All revenues generated by league operations belong directly to MLS. See Fraser, 97
F. Supp. 2d at 131. MLS owns and controls all trademarks, copyrights, and other
intellectual property rights that relate in any way either to the League or to any of its teams.
Id. MLS also owns all tickets to MLS games and receives the revenues from ticket sales.
Id. There are central league regulations regarding ticket policies, including limits on the
number of complimentary tickets any team may give away. Id.
63
See generally Gary R. Roberts, The Legality of The Exclusive Collective Sale of
Intellectual Property Rights by Sports Leagues, 3 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 52 (2001).
64
See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
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that can be associated with a maverick owner doing what he sees fit
for his particular club.65
Now, of course, there are antitrust issues there, but what you are
really trying to do is, avoid having an owner make deals on his own
that are not beneficial for the entire league and its survival.66 That is
not just an antitrust problem. That is a problem with being able to
deliver your product to the sponsors with whom you want to be
associated. The single entity model minimizes these risks, making it
a very attractive model in this competitive environment.
I think some of the new media aspects really tie into that as well.
The Internet is a whole new marketing device that we have really
seen grow in conjunction with some of the new leagues.67 It is a
place where you have another audience, and where you really need to
guarantee to your partners that you are going to be delivering what
you have said you will deliver, without having affiliated entities
doing their own thing to the detriment of your partnerships. Major
League Soccer is an example of a league where there is that kind of
certainty and related asset value.
Apart from that, there are unquestionably antitrust issues. I am
confident that Jeff Kessler will talk about those.68
But just from the management perspective, I think the bottom line
is that there is always an antitrust question, even though Brown v.
Pro Football69 did a little bit to clarify where the labor laws stop and
the antitrust laws begin.70 As long as uncertainty exists, it behooves
a league, particularly a new league that is going to face start-up
65

See Matthew Futterman, Owners Can be their Own Worst Enemy, NEWHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE, Aug. 30, 2000 (discussing the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, Jerry Jones, making
deals with sponsors that are competitors of the NFL’s sponsors).
66
Id.
67
Terry Lefton, NFL Signs Its Own Big 3, THESTANDARD.COM, July 11, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 6874179 (CBS Sportsline and the NFL entered a five-year deal for the NFL’s
Internet rights that is the richest web sports rights alliance ever).
68
See infra text accompanying notes 86-109.
69
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
70
In Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231 (1996), the Supreme Court held that when
the NFL bargained to impasse with the NFLPA over a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining and then unilaterally implemented the terms of its last good-faith bargaining
offer, it was exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Id.
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problems like limited funds, et cetera, to do what it can do to shore
up its labor situation. If shoring up its labor situation means taking
steps to prevent itself from being subject to the antitrust sword that
players might use to determine their terms and conditions of
employment, if they opt not to use the labor laws, then that is
something it really needs to take into account in structuring itself. I
do not think that this is something that investors would not consider.
This is important to them.
Looking back on the history of sports, other leagues have gone
through enormous antitrust litigation.71 Although I think we have
seen that just because you are a single entity, that does not mean you
are not going to go through some very serious antitrust litigation, but
it is an extra measure of taking care of those risks.72
I think the financing point is a very interesting one. How do you
as a single entity make yourself attractive enough in a risky area to
secure financing? When you are making an effort to appeal to
people with a lot of money, and the potentially big egos that go along
with that, but you are not willing to offer them that sort of
“individual owner” role in things, you are going to have some
difficulty.73 Part of the way you deal with that is making it clear that
in this new risky venture when you are a single entity you can spread
the financial risk around; you spread the risk; you spread the reward.
Some owners are in a position where they’ve got a big
marketplace, with a big-market club, making big-market dollars.
Perhaps their counterparts are not so fortunate. This disparity is part
of the way the market had developed in soccer in the past, and was
something MLS needed to avoid.74
71

See generally Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593
(7th Cir. 1996); L.A. Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
72
MLS is a single entity and has still undergone serious antitrust litigation. See Fraser,
97 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
73
MLS teams have had some problems keeping investors. The league took over the
D.C. United, the most successful franchise in MLS, due to an inability to find new investors
during the two years it was for sale. Major League Soccer Takes Over Troubled D.C.
United, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 15, 2000, Sports, at 11.
74
See Richard Alm, One More Time, With Feeling; Lowered Expectations, High Hopes
for MLS, THE RECORD, Apr. 7, 1996, at S15 (discussing the failure of the North American
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If you structure yourself as a single entity, you can offer your
investors the avoidance of that situation. You could say, “Listen, we
are going to share profits and losses equally on a pro rata basis in
accordance with your investment in this league, and that is one of the
ways you can avoid becoming one of those clubs that isn’t making
any money simply because of where you are, because you do not
have a good local TV deal, whatever the case may be.”
That is certainly not the kind of thing that would happen in Major
League Soccer. Obviously, given what we know has happened in
Major League Soccer, that does not guarantee you will be an
automatic financial success,75 but it means that the risks are spread
and, hopefully, in time, the rewards will be spread as well. So there
is a little bit more certainty there, and I think that, again, certainty is
something that can win out over the gratification an individual may
derive from actually “owning” a team.
Some people have said that to satisfy the ego or “ownership”
element in MLS the investors can purchase the right to manage a
team in addition to their investment in the league. But again, it is a
very different situation than if they actually owned the club, which
they do not. Perhaps the right to manage a team satisfies egos, and
perhaps it is just something that people are interested in doing, but it
is another way to secure additional financing because, at least in
Major League Soccer, there is an additional cost associated with
acquiring that right.76
The control aspect is very important for some of the reasons I
talked about a moment ago. Control refers to controlling your
sponsorship, your licensing, your marketing, and making sure that
your investors do not have the ability to go out and do otherwise,
which in a single entity such as MLS, they will not have the ability to
do. If they attempt to do that, part of what a league can do in its
documents is to carve out a very clear with or without cause
termination right. There are many creative ways of doing things
Soccer League due to financial disparities in the different markets).
75
Major League Soccer has lost in excess of $250 million since the league’s inception
in 1996. MLS Takes Control of D.C. United, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000.
76
See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
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within this structure that give you the rights you might not have, or
need in a traditional league structure.
The quality-control issue is also an interesting one. MLS has been,
at times in the press, attacked in terms of going out of its way to
achieve competitive balance within its clubs and not succeeding.77
Nobody is perfect. I think sometimes it works and sometimes it does
not, but the bottom line is, there is a mechanism there that does not
allow the clubs with the most money to change competitive balance
in a way that would undermine a start-up business.
That can be another attractive feature of securing investors. If they
come in and they say to themselves, “Well, let me step back, because
what if another investor is willing to dig down as deep into his
pockets as he can go to win, but I’m not willing or able to dig as
deep, won’t I lose out?” In MLS, the answer is no, it just will not
happen that way.
That does not mean that people do not have input into who they
may like on their team, but it does mean that there are budgetary
controls and budgetary restrictions at the league level that prevent
everything from spiraling out of control and prevent the types of
market disparity that can bring a great deal of unhealthiness to the
league, particularly a new league, as a whole.
Television agreements are another important area here, just in
terms of being able to get your product out into the marketplace.
New leagues are in a particularly volatile position in terms of being
able to get themselves on television, but the more you have to offer
the networks, the better off you will be.78 I think that has certainly
been the case with MLS, and I imagine that has been the case with
the other start-up leagues as well. Again, it is that measure of control
that you get with a single entity that you do not necessarily have with
some of the other structures.

77
MLS has been attacked by the players in the MLS litigation that the lack of
competition among teams for players has in effect eliminated the market for their talent. See
Jordan, supra note 61, at 242.
78
See Roberts, supra note 63.
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Single entities are probably in a really good position to capitalize
on streams of revenue that would otherwise be divvied up and be less
than what the league itself can get with respect to new arenas and
new playing facilities. I think that is probably an area that has yet to
be developed, but it is an important part of any single entity. I think
the longer these newer leagues are around, the more we will see that.
Just to close out on the antitrust issues, I think that we still have
this ongoing issue with whether MLS is a single entity,79 although
we do have a decision from the District of Massachusetts that says
that it is indeed a single entity.80 Part of the reason why is that Major
League Soccer is structured as a limited liability company
(hereinafter “LLC”) which, for all intents and purposes, acts as a
corporation.81
Within the LLC context, you bring in your investors, you have a
management committee (which is how LLCs like MLS are run under
the Delaware law) and there is really no reason to treat it differently
from a corporation,82 which as a single corporation will not be
subject to section 1 scrutiny because it is a single actor, and you need
more than one actor under section 1.83
I think section 1 is something where you can structure yourself to
help you to avoid some of the litigation problems of section 1.

79
Fraser was scheduled to be heard before a three-judge panel in the First Circuit Court
of Appeals on October 1, 2001. Joe Rutland, Sports Notebook, HOUSTON CHRON., Sports,
Aug. 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 23624602.
80
See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 131.
81
Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 et. seq. (1996)).
82
An LLC is a form of statutory business organization that combines some of the
advantages of a partnership with some of the advantages of a corporation. See Fraser, 97 F.
Supp. 2d at 134.
83
Section 1 of the Sherman Act only prohibits collective activity by plural economic
actors which unreasonably restrains competition. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-73 (1984) (holding that a parent company and its wholly
owned subsidiary have a “complete unity of interest” and therefore cannot violate section 1
of the Sherman Act); see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
(1984) (holding that if the league is organized and functions as a single entity it cannot be
found to be subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act; only section 2 claims apply to the
activities of a single entity).
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Section 2 is not such an easy thing to avoid, and section 2 is certainly
out there.84
But I think that as far as restructuring leagues, which is what
initially the panel was talking about here, that is a very different
issue, and it is not clear yet how, if at all, the impact of the Fraser85
case or the structure of any of the new leagues will impact the
existing leagues. I think it is a very detailed analysis that certainly
we cannot really address on this panel, but it raises some very
interesting questions.
MR. KESSLER: Thank you.
The single-entity issue is a wonderful example of how the legal
system and lawyers can mess up a business structure in this country.
It is also a good example of why panels like this can be very
dangerous, because they tend to raise concerns for businessmen that
do not make any sense, except for the desire to achieve a particular
legal result in a courtroom, as opposed to achieving a particular
result in the marketplace.
Basically, as we have seen so far, the single entity has been a
failure from a business sense. MLS, for example, which is the
leading example of a purported single-entity structure, claims in
court that it lost $250 million during its first five years of existence—
that is terrible.86 Its revenues last year were less than its first-year
revenues—that is abysmal.
Why has this happened? It has happened because fans do not like
the claimed single-entity structure. Entrepreneurs must be given the
power to hire the players for their individual teams. The absence of
control over players and rosters is something that is a detriment, not
a positive, because you create an image that there is one giant fantasy
soccer game that someone plays in the league office in which players
get ripped from their fans by a central authority and reallocated
84
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part: “Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001).
85
See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130.
86
See Fraser v. Major League Soccer L.L.C., Trial Transcript of 10/11/2000 at 2014:25; see also supra note 75.
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around the country. MLS is having trouble finding new investors
because few entrepreneurs want to own such a thing.87
So what has the single-entity structure accomplished for MLS?
Well, so far, pending appeal, it has enabled the MLS operatorinvestors to get away with having no competition for players, which
is a wonderful, anticompetitive objective to achieve if you are an
owner, but not if it also prevents you from growing your revenues. I
will talk about the appeal issues in the Fraser case in a few minutes.
The bottom line is that there is a good reason why, up until now,
all of the successful sports leagues in this country—and around the
world, by the way (this is an international result)—have adopted a
model of individual ownership of teams. The reason is that the
professional team sports business is basically a local business. You
get a local personality who runs it. You want an entrepreneur who
will develop it. You want to create an association between the team
and the local fans and have the sense that the teams are, in fact,
competing, because you are selling, in sports, the product of
competition, in which each team has a separate interest from the
other teams.88 That is what works. It is what has worked from the
very beginning of baseball, basketball, football, hockey, rugby and
soccer around the world, and in almost any sport that you can
think of.
Generally, economists will tell you that businesses adopt structures
because they are efficient and they are effective. If the so-called
single-entity structure had independent economic value, it would
have been adopted thirty years ago. It would not have taken until
87

Eric Fisher, Anschutz Takes Over United; Billionaire Operates Three Other MLS
Teams, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at B1 (noting that control over the D.C. United team
gives one owner control of one-third of the teams in MLS); MLS Eliminates Fusion, Mutiny
(Jan. 8, 2002) (containing the league announcement that both Florida teams are to cease
operations, leaving MLS with only three remaining investor-operators—Philip Anschutz
with five teams, Lamar Hunt with two teams, and Robert Kraft with one team), at
http://www.mlsnet.com/content/02/msl0108miatb.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).
88
Debbie Thorn et al., The Impact of Sports Marketing Relationships and Antitrust
Issues in United States, J. PUB. POL’Y & MKT., Apr. 1, 2001, at 73, available at 2001 WL
25436089 (arguing that the product associated with professional sports is “the entertainment
of competition” and that the business of sports involves competition with the players
competing for space on teams, teams competing for players, and leagues competing for team
locations).
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now for lawyers to think of it for purely legal reasons. So the idea of
trying to create a single entity to escape antitrust liability, as far as I
am concerned, has been terrible not just for the players involved, but
for the business of professional team sports.
The Continental Basketball Association recently collapsed as a
minor league, and arguably that was in part because Isiah Thomas
convinced them to change their structure to form a single entity.89 It
existed for many years, when there were individual entrepreneurs
operating the individual teams. In one year, they put together a
single-entity structure, and the whole thing collapsed.90 This does
not seem like a coincidence.
Most of the start-up leagues that have tried a single-entity structure
have failed. We’ll talk about the WNBA separately because I think
that is a different case, at least economically, because it is really a
structure where the teams in one league, the NBA, own another
league and the NBA itself is clearly not a single entity. But the
overall point is that the single-entity league, as a business model, has
so far proven to be an economic failure.
So why did the MLS owners choose to form a single entity? They
did it so that they could claim an exemption from section 1 of the
Sherman Act and not have to compete with each other for their
players. There is no other reason. In a series of antitrust cases in the
1970s, 1980s and through the early 1990s, essentially the rule was
that if you were not labor-exempt by having a union in place and
fighting over the meaning of the labor exemption, the restrictions
imposed by owners to restrain competition for players were held to
be illegal.91 There was a consistent losing record by the owners on
89

See Lester Munson & L. Jon Wertheim, Demise of the CBA: Music to their Ears;
After Selling the Owners on his Plan to Turn the League Around, Isiah Thomas Quickly Led
the CBA into Bankruptcy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL
8024730.
90
See id.
91
See, e.g., Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding
that the Rozelle Rule was an unreasonable restraint of trade because the Rozelle Rule was
significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve legitimate business purposes); Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the NFL draft was an
unreasonable restraint of trade); McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
¶ 69,982, 68,769 (D. Minn. 1992), available at 1992 WL 315292 (holding that the NFL’s
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this point.92 Absent the labor exemption, whenever you got to the
merits of the case, virtually all player restraints were found to be
unreasonable restraints of trade.93
So the sports team owners went to their lawyers and said, “Can’t
you do anything about this?” Well, one of the things they tried to do
was to assert the single-entity defense for the old established leagues,
and that argument lost repeatedly.94 Even the Seventh Circuit in the
Chicago Bulls case, which indicated that maybe, in some cases, a
single-entity defense could apply, also said “but not for players, not
when you are restraining competition between the teams for their
employees.”95
So the single-entity defense had little value for the old, established
leagues, and the existing leagues are not likely to ever restructure
themselves to become a single entity. Every one of the older teams
has a totally different market value and it is unlikely that they could
ever put Humpty Dumpty together again in a new single-entity
structure. So the single-entity issue is really an issue for new,
fledgling leagues.
Here is where the lawyers come in. They tell the entrepreneurs
who are going to form a new league that, if they put all of their teams
Plan B was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of antitrust law); Jackson v. Nat’l
Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (D. Minn. 1992); Boris v. United States Football
League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 66,012 (C.D. Cal. 1984), available at 1984 WL 894;
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Robertson v. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 890-91, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bowman v. Nat’l
Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Minn. 1975); Kapp v. Nat’l Football League,
390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978); Denver Rockets
v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. See also Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, ‘Fraser v. Major League Soccer’—
Sports Leagues as Single Entities?, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 2000, at 3 (stating that judges have
repeatedly failed to look past the individual ownership of teams when deciding whether
traditional sports leagues can assert the single-entity defense, citing Sullivan v. Nat’l
Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l
Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football
League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871
(D. Minn. 1992)).
95
See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 599-600
(7th Cir. 1996).
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into one holding company to own the whole thing, they then can
claim that they are a single entity, which does not have to compete
with each other for players, at least under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.96
So what happens? Major League Soccer is a good example. No
sports entrepreneur really wants to invest in such a league, so an
internal struggle develops among the Major League Soccer
entrepreneurs. “Do we really have to give up all this control? Can’t
we operate our teams separately? Can’t we have separate franchise
values? Do we really have to share all of our profits?” And a
compromise is reached that keeps shifting, and that is what the
record facts in the Fraser case show.97 The MLS owners never
formed a true single entity, because they did not want to give up
individual team control. MLS is not a passive corporation in which
people own stock and sit home and watch to see if their stock goes
up or down and then sell it. MLS is a company, an LLC, in which
each of the investor-operators buy the rights, in a special class of
stock, to run their individual teams, and they can resell those rights,
and keep somewhere between fifty and fifty-five percent of their
locally-generated revenues.98 (Just like, by the way, the type of
revenue sharing that exists in the NFL, the NBA, and Major League
Baseball.) The percentages vary, but the concept is the same
economic structure. You can resell your ownership interest to run a
sports team, and you can therefore develop a separate market value
for your franchise.99 You do not share your profits and losses.100 So
96

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2001) (“Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal”); see also
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
97
See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 132-33 (describing the management of Major League
Soccer).
98
See id. See, e.g., MLS Eliminates Fusion, Mutiny, supra note 87 (“[T]he League has
made significant changes to its operating relationship with its teams. These adjustments will
provide enhanced revenue opportunities at the local level by allowing teams to retain a
greater share of revenue from ticket sales, local sponsorship and television.”).
99
Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133, 136 (operator-investors can harvest the value of the
particular teams they operate by selling their operational rights or by requiring the league to
pay them the fair market value of their investment).
100
Id. “Admittedly, unlike differentiated shares of stock, the market value of a team
operator’s investment will not simply reflect an aliquot share of the whole enterprise, but
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the MLS investor-operator in New York would have an entirely
different set of profits and losses than the MLS investor-operator in
Chicago, based upon how he operates his team and manages his
revenues and expenses.101
Who hires coaches in MLS? The individual MLS operatorinvestors hire them.102 The League does not. All of the MLS team
employees are separately hired by and paid for by the individual
operator-investors, except for the players.103 This is no coincidence.
The players are the ones who are centrally hired by the League in
order to prevent any competition from taking place.104
So, in the end, I do not think MLS is a true single-entity structure
and I don’t think it is exempt from section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Tandy O’Donoghue does.105 In the end, the First Circuit will sort all
of this out.
But whether or not MLS is a true single entity, the point is that the
MLS structure has clearly not been a good thing for the business of
MLS. The concept of a single entity has become the exclusive focus
of the operator-investors in Major League Soccer. It blinds them to
the fact that operating a league in which the individual teams do not
hire players is an unattractive business for the fans. The MLS
owners sit there and say, “We are going to fight to preserve our
structure.” Why? So that they can lose another $250 million?
Would you invest in such a single entity? It does not make any
sense, but that is where we are.
On the section 2 issue, we also did not get to present a section 2
claim against the MLS single-entity structure because the judge
ended up ruling that the MLS single entity not only was immune
will also reflect in certain respects the success of the local operation.” Id.
101
Id. at 133 (noting that, for example, in 1997 individual team operators received 100%
of the first $1.24 million and 30% of the excess over $1.24 million of local broadcasts and
sponsorship revenues (with annual increases), and 50-55% of ticket revenues from home
games and stadium revenues).
102
Id. (“It is undisputed that “team operators are responsible for . . . general team
administration, including salaries of the team’s management and coaching staff.”).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 137-38.
105
See supra text accompanying notes 59-85.
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from section 1 review, but that it was immune from the section 2
case as well. The section 2 trial thus ended up being about an
entirely different issue, the conspiracy between MLS and the USSF
to exclude a rival soccer league. In this case, the jury came back and
found that there was no relevant market proven.106 So the MLS jury
trial tells us nothing about a possible section 2 claim against a singleentity structure. Maybe we will find out more about this on appeal.
As for the WNBA, I will say a couple of words about that.
Obviously, the NBA is not a single entity.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: That is not so obvious.
MR. KESSLER: Well, okay. It appears to me that the courts will
not find the NBA to be a single entity, at least with respect to its
players. We have several decisions that would establish that point at
least.107
The NBA is a traditional non-single-entity structure. It went into
the WNBA as a second business. The NBA teams, in effect, own the
WNBA, and they claim single entity in that sense.108 However, the
individual NBA teams, as I understand it, also have the right to
operate specific WNBA franchises and keep much of the profits from
such operations. We will see how it works from an economic
standpoint. The New York Knicks, to give an example, are owned
ultimately by Cablevision in a structure, which everyone, I believe,
recognizes is a separate entity from the other owners in the NBA.
The Knicks operate the WNBA’s New York Liberty, generating
different profits and losses than the other NBA owners make on their
WNBA teams. Perhaps this hybrid model will have a better chance
of succeeding with fans in the marketplace than the MLS model,
106

Fraser v. Major League Soccer, Trial Transcript of 12/11/2000, at 6805:2-22.
See Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 890-91, 893 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
see also Robert E. Freitas, Overview: Looking Ahead at Sports and the Antitrust Law,
Special Sports Issue: Antitrust and the Business Side of Sports, 14-SPG ANTITRUST 15, 16
(2000) (noting that the NBA is not a single entity with respect to market for players’
services).
108
Sarah Talalay, WNBA Is Achieving Steady, Cautious Growth, RECORD (Northern N.J),
June 18, 2000, at S04, available at 2000 WL 15819232 (stating that the WNBA was created
as a single entity and that all twenty-nine teams in the NBA own equal shares of the
WNBA).
107
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because WNBA fans seem to believe that the WNBA teams have
more control over how their players are signed and allocated.
In terms of a single-entity defense, my own view is—and we will
see what happens in the First Circuit—that the WNBA owners will
not be able to hide under this defense. The reason is that the WNBA
teams appear to be controlled by a group of separate entities that do
not share profits and losses in an economic sense.
Now, if we lose in the First Circuit, and it eventually becomes the
law that merely forming an LLC structure governs over economic
reality, then we might face a different story. But for now, we have a
district court decision in Fraser that I think is wrong, and we will
find out what happens on appeal. The First Circuit will obviously
have something to say about the future of the single-entity defense,
and it may get played out in other Circuits as well.
In the labor exemption area, there were competing rules in the
different circuits for years before the Supreme Court finally took the
issue in Brown v. Pro Football and resolved the issue in the courts.109
Eventually, that might happen with the single-entity issue as well.
MR. EDEL: Jeff, thank you.
I think he has thrown down the gauntlet for you, Jamin.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: I guess he has. I was asked to fill in at the
last minute for the XFL General Counsel, so I want to apologize in
advance for those of you who were expecting a smash-mouth, inyour-face, sexually charged legal debate. About the only thing the
WNBA has in common with the XFL is the amount of time our
cameras stay focused on women during game broadcasts.
I was asked to discuss the day-to-day business differences between
working for a single-entity structured league like the WNBA and a
more traditional league. So I walked down the hall before I came
here today and compared notes with the NBA General Counsel.

109

Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (holding that a non-statutory
antitrust exemption applies where there is a collective-bargaining relationship between a
union and employer).
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With respect to collective bargaining, no one on this panel would
argue with the fact that the NBA is a single entity—it speaks with
one voice to the Players Association.110 The same is true of the
WNBA.111
The NBA General Counsel spends a lot of time negotiating and
drafting media contracts for TV, radio, and the Internet—leading few
to argue that the NBA is not a single entity with respect to
negotiating media contracts.112
The same applies with respect to sponsorship and licensing
agreements. The NBA acts with one voice as a single entity when it
licenses T-shirts and sells national sponsorships and video games and
the like.113 Again, the same is true of the WNBA.114
The other thing that both the NBA and WNBA spend a lot of time
doing is enforcing trademark and other intellectual property rights.
Again, very few people on this panel would argue that the NBA is
not a single entity when it comes to dealing with its trademark and
intellectual property rights.115
Baseball may be the least centralized of all the major sports, but
even baseball is trending in the direction of becoming more
centralized. It has just recently centralized its Internet businesses,
and it is obviously a single entity with respect to its TV negotiations,
collective bargaining and licensing.
It is really a historical accident that many of these traditional socalled sports leagues are not considered single entities. When the
110

See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that for
the purpose of negotiating with the Players’ Association, the NBA teams have bargained as
a multi-employer bargaining unit).
111
See Stephen Nidetz, Hunter Gives Stern Silent Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1998.
112
See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir.
1996) (concluding that when acting in the broadcasting market the NBA is more like a
single firm than multiple firms).
113
See Brandon L. Grusd, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports’ LeagueWide Licensing and Merchandising Arrangements, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1, 11-12 (1999).
114
See Alisa Solomon, Clutch Purse; Women’s Stake in the Sports-Industrial Complex,
VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 28, 1998.
115
See Louis Klein, National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.: Future Prospects
for Protecting Real-Time Information, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 585, 597 (1998).
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NBA was formed fifty-some years ago,116 when eight guys got in a
room and decided to start a league, they very easily could have
started a corporation or an LLC, if that format was around back then.
Instead, they started a joint venture. I do not think, as Jeff might say,
that it was because they needed to show the fans that they were
competing. I think that it was just a business decision they made at
the time and it bears very little reference to the way the league
operates today.
I took the liberty of thumbing through the NBA Operations
Manual before I came over here this morning. It is full of rules and
regulations telling the teams how they must operate if they want to
be a part of the NBA family—a member of the League.
It has a lot of rules and regulations that you might expect to see.
For instance, how far out is the three-point line, how big is the
basketball, how long is each quarter.117 But it also has a lot of rules
you may not expect to see. I think it has about ten pages on what
team mascots can and cannot do on the court.118 They are allowed to
mock referees, but only during time-outs and only if they get the
referee’s permission.119 They are not allowed to rappel from the
ceiling.120 They are not allowed to hang on the rim.121 They are not
allowed to stand on the scorer’s table.122
Decibel levels, noise levels, and what kind of music can be played
during the game and time-outs, is all outlined in the Manual.123
Championship ring guidelines are also detailed. There has to be a
certain number of diamonds in the championship ring when the team

116

See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 771 n.180; see also Christian M. Mc Burney, Note,
The Legality of Sports Leagues’ Restrictive Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925,
942 n.104 (1985) (establishing that the NBA emerged in 1949).
117
The NBA Operations Manual is an internal league document, and is not available for
citation.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Supra note 117.
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wins the championship and a certain level of clarity in the
diamonds.124
There are even regulations about the number of toilets that a new
arena has to include if an NBA team is going to play in it.125 So
every level of detail is contained within this Operations Manual. It
really exhibits just how centralized all of these businesses have
become—especially the NBA, the league that I used to work for fulltime and still occasionally moonlight for.
It is too easy to say that a traditional sports league is not a single
entity. The court cases are certainly starting to trend in the other
direction. Jeff mentioned the Chicago Bulls case.126 That case
certainly went pretty far in saying that the NBA was a single entity
with respect to a lot of its businesses.127 It has taken a long time for
the courts to recognize the economic realities of how all of these
businesses really operate—but the pendulum has clearly swung.
There is one major difference between what I do and what the
NBA General Counsel does. The time that he spends administering
the NBA salary cap is the time that I spend negotiating and signing
player contracts directly with the League.
Jeff also used the example of the Continental Basketball
Association (hereinafter “CBA”). It is a good example of how the
single-entity structure is not a magic bullet. MLS is losing money.128
The WNBA is losing money.129 The ABL was a women’s
professional sports league that organized as a single entity, but it had
a bad business plan and it went out of business after a couple of
124

Id.
Id.
126
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir 1996).
127
Id. at 600 (concluding that the NBA is closer to a single firm than a group of
independent firms when acting in the broadcasting market).
128
Steve Davis, Playing On: Concerns Remain, But Survival No Longer Main Issue,
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Apr. 5, 2001, at 4B, available at 2001 WL 18812247 (explaining
that Major League Soccer lost approximately $250 million over its first five years in
business).
129
Shannon Rose, Growing Pains Survival of WNBA Depending on TV 1st, Bigger Fan
Base 2nd, ORLANDO SENT., July 15, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL 9197186 (reporting
that the “WNBA is still losing money.”).
125
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years.130 It paid players too much, and it played during the wrong
season.131 The magic bullet that the ABL may have thought the
single-entity structure provided did not work. Maybe when Isiah
Thomas formed the single-entity structure of the CBA, he also
mistakenly thought it was a magic bullet.132 So I agree with Jeff that
the single-entity structure is not a magic bullet in any way, shape, or
form.
There are other issues—negatives—regarding the single entity
structure that are rarely spoken about. One is more personal and one
is more global.
I will start on a personal note. This is the time of year when the
WNBA negotiates and signs player contracts. In the next two
months, I will be negotiating about a hundred veteran contracts and
about another hundred rookie contracts. It is not my favorite time of
year. It is certainly not my family’s favorite time of year. If I am a
little grumpy today, it is because I have already had several salary
conversations this morning with players and their agents.
The discussions are really quite sobering. These are elite players
that have worked very hard to get to the top of their profession. And
I have to explain to them that they are not going to get A-Rod
money, they are not going to get Shaq money, in fact, they are not
even going to get first-year lawyer money.133 They are going to
130

See Jayda Evans, Summer Storm Brewing, SEATTLE TIMES, May 30, 2000, at D1,
available at 2000 WL 5538069 (stating that the ABL filed for bankruptcy on Dec. 12,
1998).
131
See id. (reporting that “player salaries were the death of the ABL.”).
132
See Lester Munson & L. Jon Wertheim, Demise of the CBA: Music to their Ears;
After Selling the Owners on his Plan to Turn the League Around, Isiah Thomas Quickly Led
the CBA into Bankruptcy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL
8024730 (describing the demise of the CBA after Isiah Thomas bought the league and
transformed it into a single entity).
133
See Tim Brown, Shaq’s Max O’Neal Finally Gets His Three-Year, $88.4-Million
Extension, Answering a lot of Questions about the Future of the Lakers, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2000, at D1, available at 2000 WL 25907032; Earl Gustkey, Salary Doesn’t Pay in
WNBA Pro Basketball: Season Starts Today with Players Unhappy They Receive only a
Third of Earning Potential in Europe, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2000, at D4, available at 2000
WL 2245437; Rangers Break the Bank, Sign Alex Rodriguez for Ten
Years $252 Million, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 12, 2000, available at
http://www.freepress.com/sports/baseball/horn12_20001212.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
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receive on average something in the range of $50,000 to $60,000.134
Those figures are a hard pill to swallow and they cause a lot of
understandable animosity.
I think the low point for me was when a player thought her agent
was not doing a very good job, and I was not budging, so she decided
to put her grandmother on the phone. It was a very unpleasant
conversation, and the grandmother used words that I had never heard
my grandparents use. But it was from the heart. She tried to explain
that I did not understand where her granddaughter had come from,
and I could not possibly understand how hard she had to work to get
to the level she was at. She found it unconscionable that her
granddaughter was not being offered six figures. It was a very hard
conversation. But that is the personal aspect of my job that I hate
and will always hate, and it is, I think, endemic, as Jeff said, to the
single-entity structure.
But there is a more systemic issue with the single-entity structure
as well. We have a member of the WNBA Players Association in the
audience who was on one of the earlier panels here, and I think he
might tell you that when we go into collective bargaining, we are
going to be sitting across the table—myself, the President of the
WNBA, Val Ackerman,135 and others—we will be sitting across the
table from players whose salaries we negotiated.
In a traditional sports league, in the NBA model, for example,
those decisions are diffused among the twenty-nine general managers
and the players are not sitting across the table from the people who
made those decisions directly. They are sitting across the table from
the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner and the General
Counsel.
The union may be able to really galvanize and focus the players on
who the bad guys are when they are sitting directly across the table.
So I think when we do have collective bargaining negotiations in the
134

Joanna Cagan, Ballin’ Abroad: European Pro Leagues Still a Destination for Women
Hoopsters, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 24, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9089405 (stating that
$55,000 is the average salary for a player in the WNBA).
135
For a brief biography of Ackerman, see http://www.wnba.com/basics/ackerman
_bio.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
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next year or so, it will be interesting to see whether that galvanizing
effect has an impact and whether it is something that really is not to
the benefit of the League—signing players directly from the center.
There has been a lot of discussion about why leagues form as
single entities. We put a lot of thought into it. We did not just
decide that the single-entity structure is a magic bullet, to use Jeff’s
phrase.
We formed as a single entity because it more accurately reflected
the way that we do business—from the center—and for the reason
that Tandy said, to try our best to shrink the target that is on all of
our backs. As anybody who has worked for a professional sports
league knows, that is the antitrust litigation target. Antitrust
litigation has become the weapon of choice. Fortunately, it did not
work against Major League Soccer, which has somehow been able to
absorb huge litigation costs—costs that I am not sure the WNBA
could absorb.136 But fortunately we have not had to test that one out
quite yet.
The bottom line with respect to a sports league is not whether it is
a single-entity structure or whether it has a more traditional structure;
it is the business plan. A successful league is about getting butts in
the seats, finding a way to make it work, creating local excitement.
Everything else flows from that.
To paraphrase the guy with the Arkansas accent who is living up
in Chappaqua now: it is the business plan, stupid; it is not the legal
structure.137
When you are starting a sports league, the lawyers are the least
important people in the room. If you are going to compete in the
really crowded entertainment marketplace right now, get the lawyers
out of the picture, and figure out a way to get people interested in
your product.
136

Grahame L. Jones, MLS; Jury Rules in Favor of League in Player Suit, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2000, at D3 (stating that Major League Soccer won the antitrust lawsuit brought by
the players).
137
Referring to former President Bill Clinton, whose unofficial campaign slogan in 1992
was, “It’s the economy, stupid.”
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MR. EDEL: Jamin, thank you.
I thought what we would do at this point is open up for questions.
I would like to take the prerogative of the chair to ask the first one.
Perhaps I should address this specifically to Ken and Jamin, which is
on Jeff’s point: Does the single-entity model reduce entrepreneurial
zeal? What we have seen in each example of a single-entity league
is that the league is losing money. Some may not survive, some may
come out of it at some point, but they are losing money. Is this
inherent in the single-entity model, and is that a good reason then to
avoid it?
MR. SHROPSHIRE: Well, the entrepreneur is the person at the
top of the league. That is the person who may or may not come out
with some funds on top.
Roller derby, from our childhood, that was the single entity that
worked. Every time you saw the New York Bombers and L.A. TBirds, they were in the same facility, same people switching teams,
all in one city. I do not know who ran the thing, but people
recognized it as entertainment and were not looking at it for the same
sort of competition that you look for traditionally in sports.
But if you take away the individual owners, there may be some
tweaking that will come up that will give somebody a way to have
control of a franchise in a way that the fans will recognize. But so
far, I do not think anybody has come up with a way. In the
traditional model, we are used to seeing teams being led by owners
that have their own self-interest in winning games.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: Again, I think it is the business plan. You
can accomplish anything if you can get the local buzz. But I do think
it is a local business. I think that is an important thing to discuss. It
can be a single entity and still be a local business. General Motors
understands that they have to take into account the local dealers and
let the local dealers make some important decisions about how they
manufacture and market their cars. We believe that as well in the
WNBA.
Whether we are a single entity or in the case of the NBA, a socalled traditional sports league, we are going to give a lot of power
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and a lot of input to the local owners, and we are also going to make
sure that the fans understand that the local operators on the WNBA
side, the local owners on the NBA side, have significant input with
respect to the players and the product on the court. Nobody seriously
doubts the competitiveness of WNBA teams, even though the team
operators do not own the teams.
As far as turning a profit, again, it is just that there are too many
leagues starting out in a crowded entertainment marketplace right
now. We are about to start another league, the NBDL, the National
Basketball Developmental League, which we are going to start as a
single entity as well. But it is just as crowded a marketplace today,
and everybody wants to get on the bandwagon, making it very tough.
I do think that the WNBA will turn a profit in the future, whether
we are a single entity or not. I think the marketplace is ready for it,
and I think the fans are interested and it will take.
QUESTIONER: Mr. Kessler, you spoke very adamantly about the
single-entity leagues. It seems that, while perhaps it may not be the
optimal structure, it is preferable to not having a league at all. I was
wondering if you would speak a moment on whether you think that
in the absence of the single-entity option, new leagues would even be
launched, given the risks?
MR. KESSLER: Absolutely, because if you accept my premise
that they have a greater chance of generating revenues and fan
interest if they are not formed as a single entity, then simple
economics will tell you that they will be more attractive to investors
and will attract fans with a traditional league structure. Plenty of
new leagues have been formed over the years using such a structure.
That is how you got the American Football League, which eventually
merged with the NFL. It was not because it was a single-entity
structure. If there is a market and sufficient demand for new leagues,
and absent some other anticompetitive activities going on, then you
would expect new leagues to form.
My main point is if the single-entity structure were efficient, it
would not be driven by legal advice, which clearly it has been. If
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you look through the evidence in the Major League Soccer138 case—
and this will all be in the First Circuit brief, so read my brief and you
will see it—the evidence shows that the decision to form a single
entity was driven by antitrust advice, it was not driven by economics
or market forces. There was a very specific legal reason why the
MLS ownership wanted to do this.
I think the whole issue of entrepreneurship is key. I will use the
NBA as an example. Mark Cuban, the owner of the Dallas
Mavericks, is a Commissioner’s nightmare. However, he is
wonderful for Dallas. If you look at what has happened in
attendance in Dallas, in the competitiveness of the Dallas team, it has
been a brilliant entrepreneurial play in what had been a very
moribund NBA marketplace.139 Now, Mr. Cuban drives the
Commissioner crazy. He is the antithesis of centralized league
control. But that is because the NBA is not a single entity. They do
not allow for that. The NBA will have different levels of compliance
with league rules by different owners, and they are not all going to be
Mark Cubans. But the point is that allowing this type of
independence is a good thing from a product and fan standpoint; it is
not a bad thing. The single-entity structure, by contrast, stifles that
entrepreneurial ability.
QUESTIONER: This question is directed to Mr. Kessler. You
make the argument that the structure of the MLS is adversely
affecting the product. But you do not seem to address the issue that
perhaps the product of soccer in the United States may just be too
flawed to work. If we look at the past, in the United States no soccer
league has ever succeeded—the NASL, any indoor soccer league,
anything else.
And also, perhaps for start-up leagues in America, there is not the
market for them that people seem to think that there is. In fact, no
138

97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000).
Steve Frank (reporting), Profile: Entrepreneur and Dallas Mavericks Owner Mark
Cuban, CNBC: Early Today, Apr. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 22705370; Barbara
Barker, Maverick Owner: He’s Not Just About Fines; Billionaire Cuban Turns Dallas, NBA
Upside Down, NEWSDAY, Feb. 4, 2001, at C8, available at 2001 WL 9215239 (describing
the success Dallas has encountered since Mark Cuban became the team’s owner).
139

PANEL3.FINAL

450

2/15/02 2:54 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

start-up league has truly been a stable financial success since the
NBA really started fifty years ago. Can you address those concerns?
MR. KESSLER: Sure. They just came out with a survey of fan
interest. It was published in the most recent Sports Business Journal.
Professional soccer as a whole—they do not limit it to any league—
is more popular among fans in the United States than, for example,
tennis or golf. It is not that far below hockey in terms of its level of
fan interest; in fact, it is quite close to hockey. It is also quite close
to some of the college sports. There is clearly a market and demand
for professional soccer in this country at a respectable level that can
more than support it.
In fact, in the first year of its existence, MLS on its revenue side—
and this is in the public record—had more than $60 million in
revenue. That is extremely respectable for the first year of operation.
So the idea that there is not sufficient demand to support
professional soccer in the United States is just not correct. I think
soccer in this country can succeed. I think its single-entity structure
is hurting it, not helping it.
QUESTIONER: Let me just ask a follow-up to the first issue
before we address the second issue. I happen to be a tremendous
soccer fan—European soccer, the top leagues in the world, simply
because of fan interest and money over there. I have never attended
or watched an MLS game in the United States.
MR. KESSLER: Why not?
MS. O’DONOGHUE: You should.
MR. SHROPSHIRE: Why not?
QUESTIONER: A basic lack of interest.
MR. KESSLER: Why do you lack interest?
QUESTIONER: I do not know who the players are.
MR. KESSLER: Ah, okay.
QUESTIONER: And, in general, the quality of the League is
simply not the same as it can be in an England, in an Italy, in a
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Spain, because there is simply so much more money and interest
there, just as a basketball league in Italy can never achieve what it
can in the United States, simply because of interest and money.
MR. KESSLER: If you look at those leagues that you are
interested in, they all obviously are organized along independent
ownership where the teams compete. In fact, in soccer, as you know,
they have this relegation system, which I actually think is brilliant.
For those of you who are not soccer fans worldwide, in the secondtier leagues, the best teams can play their way into the top league,
and the worst teams in the top league play themselves into the second
league. It creates yet another competitive inducement for teams to
improve themselves and creates tremendous interest for fans.
You do not know many MLS players in the United States. That is
exactly the problem, and that is because the single-entity structure is
incapable of developing individual player personalities in local
markets, who fans can identify with on any systematic basis. In fact,
the few times that players in MLS have been developed in certain
markets, they have ended up getting moved by the single entity to
other franchises, over the protests of the investor-operators who were
running the teams. This does not create fan interest. This is the
problem.
MR. EDEL: Tandy?
MS. O’DONOGHUE: Needless to say, I disagree. The singleentity structure is not the issue here. I think that your answer is the
answer that, unfortunately, Major League Soccer has been hearing.
It is not, “We don’t come to your games because you are a single
entity.” It is a difficult proposition. Soccer clearly in this country is
not what soccer is in the countries where it is the game.
England is a perfect example. I have a hard time imagining that if
the premier league were to turn into a single entity, people would
stop going. I mean, that is what they live for over there.
I also have a hard time with the fact that the single entity has
prevented people from learning who Cobi Jones is.140 People here
140

For a brief biography of Jones, see http://www.lagalaxy.com/roster/cobijones.html
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may not know who Cobi Jones is, but I think the reason is because
you are following other sports in a crowded marketplace, you are not
interested in soccer. That is part of Major League Soccer’s problem.
I think the people at MLS probably shudder at the thought of
where the league would be were it not a single entity. The single
entity has not put the league where it is. What has put the league
where it is—and the people at MLS know this, and know that these
are the things they need to work on—is difficulty with fan interest,
regardless of whether a survey says that it is more popular than
men’s golf or women’s tennis.141
If anyone has a chance to go to Columbus, Ohio, I urge you to stop
by Crew Stadium.142 That is how soccer is intended to be presented
to its audience, in a small specific stadium—not at Giants Stadium
with 76,000 seats, where you only want to fill 20,000 to have your
ultimate soccer game. That is how it is meant to be played.
So there are very specific packaging issues that MLS has faced, it
knows it is facing them, and it will continue to face them—including
educating people about soccer and making the stars known.
The local operators, in addition to the teams that MLS operates, go
out of their way to educate their markets about their important
players. So there are other struggles there that have nothing to do
with the single entity. In fact, I think the single entity is a critical
part of the reason MLS is still here today, despite the litigation that
has surrounded it.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: There are so many ways to have local
incentives. Jeff wants player salaries to go through the roof; that is
his only goal—an admirable quest. But you can create fan
excitement and you can give local investors all the incentive in the
world to win by using many different types of mechanisms. It does
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
141
Soccer is the most popular sport in the world today. Walton Morais, Brazilian Soccer
Sensation, BUS. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, at 33, available at 1999 WL 27555043.
142
Crew Stadium is the only soccer-specific stadium in the United States. It holds
22,500 fans very close to the field to keep them in the action. See Soccer’s New Work Site,
at http://www.columbus.org/showcase/crewstadium (last visited Jan. 5, 2002) for more
information on Crew Stadium.

PANEL3.FINAL

2002]

2/15/02 2:54 PM

RESTRUCTURING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

453

not have to be the traditional joint venture or partnership model.
You could simply have local incentives, which we have in the
WNBA, where a lot of local revenue gets retained. You can have
bonus structures for winning. There are all kinds of things you can
do.
You do not have to dismiss the single-entity structure, as Jeff does,
just because player salaries do not get “A-Rod’ed” through the roof
every time you turn around.
MR. KESSLER: Actually, the only way player salaries go up
substantially is if revenues can support it, no matter what model we
create. I can have an entirely competitive marketplace, and if there
are no revenues, then there are not high player salaries, because you
have to have revenues. The reason why teams bid for players in the
competitive marketplace is because they believe the player is going
to enhance their ability to make more money. Otherwise, you would
not bid.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: What about the Mark Cubans?
MR. KESSLER: That is a good example.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: Mark Cuban is doing this because he’s got
play money and he wants to win. It has nothing to do with revenues.
MR. KESSLER: I do not agree with that at all. Look at the
attendance at his team. Mark Cuban has made much more money for
his team this year through his pursuit of players and other
entrepreneurial activities.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: No. He has lost much more money than the
previous owner. The reality is he spent money to try to get the buzz
going, and he has done a heck of a job and we love it. You say he is
the Commissioner’s thorn. Mark Cuban is doing great things. I
mean, do we like it when he jumps on the court? No.
MR. KESSLER: Well, then we agree.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: Yes. But it is not about revenues with him,
it’s toy money, it’s play money.
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MR. KESSLER: I think it is about making his team successful. He
likes to win, but that is all part of it.
MR. DERSHOWITZ: Yes. Nothing to do with revenue.
MR. EDEL: Why don’t we go to the next question, now that we
seem to have found some common ground here?
QUESTIONER: Going back to that issue, though, since the
American Basketball Association was losing millions and had to
merge with the NBA, the American Football League was losing
millions and had to merge with the NFL—the World Hockey
Association, the United States Football League (hereinafter “USFL),
the World Football League, all were traditionally structured leagues;
they all went out of business. Isn’t it more likely to assume that the
reason any sports league coming into this marketplace fails is
because of the competitive nature of the market, not the single-entity
structure? And also, don’t you think that your lawsuit, which would
have made the investors liable for triple damages, scared away any
potential investors in the League for the last four years?
MR. KESSLER: I doubt it. The lawsuit could have been settled at
any time for a fair system for the players. But the MLS owners are
not interested in that. Rather, they are only interested in defending
the single-entity structure of the League, so that is what we are going
to have to fight about.
But the point is, you are quite right, that sports is a competitive
business. No one is saying, and I am certainly not saying, that if
MLS did not have a single entity, it would be guaranteed success.
However, on balance, the single entity is a negative in their ability to
succeed, and I think it is a contributor to their lack of success. But
you are quite right; MLS owners would still have to compete and be
successful, with or without it. The league still needs good owners; it
still has to have a sound business plan. I also agree that a business
plan and leadership are critical at the individual team level in terms
of making the sport successful. So no one is saying this would
guarantee success.
Now, there are different things going on here, too. For those
leagues that you mentioned, there were different things going on in
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each case. The American Football League was successful, and that
was a completely different case from some of the other leagues you
mentioned.
The USFL was unsuccessful, but it won a
monopolization case against the NFL, but only won a dollar, so there
was really a strange set of circumstances there.143 There are a lot of
different reasons why different leagues failed.
On the whole, what seems to have worked best, if you look at what
has proven itself, have been leagues like the NFL and the NBA,
where you have individually owned and operated teams who
compete for players; but yes, you also have a certain amount of jointventure activity.
I would not say that all league centralization is bad. It is subject to
antitrust review. But, having joint marketing and promotion, and
doing the things the leagues do in licensing and business
development, have generally been good things. These efforts are
subject to antitrust review, but they can still be reasonable
agreements to advance the joint-venture business. So a complete
separation in terms of team operations may not be economically
desirable either. In fact, I do not think it would be.
QUESTIONER: Has anyone considered doing it from the other
direction, starting perhaps as a single entity and then ceding more
and more rights to individual operators so they almost grow into
becoming owners, give the league some traction for a few years and
then start moving toward a more traditional format? Has anyone
thought of that, or are there any downfalls there that I am not
thinking of?
MR. DERSHOWITZ: We think about it every day. We are in an
experimental mode. We are looking for anything that works. I think
it was probably the right decision to initially organize the WNBA as
a single entity. Five years from now, it could be, we will shake it up.
I have no idea.

143

1988).

United States Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir.
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QUESTIONER: I mean, would it be an instant switch, or are you
considering, like I said, slowly ceding more power to the individual
operators?
MR. DERSHOWITZ: We are also considering more
centralization. This is a business where we are open to any kind of
suggestions to make this thing work. I do not think anybody has
thought about blowing up the model completely, but if we can think
of a way to make this thing profitable—improve the P&L’s—we
would do it in an instant.
QUESTIONER: In the effort to keep salaries down, given the fact
that this is sort of a global enterprise—with the exception of the
WNBA, because women’s opportunities are so small—do you think
that you may be blowing the opportunity to take it to the next level,
in that if you look at where a lot of the NHL talent is coming from
right now, it is coming from abroad because they pay more and it is a
higher value for the players. Or if you look at the NBA,
increasingly, the NBA rosters are filled out by international players;
they are still predominantly Americans, but there is some very strong
international talent.
You look at soccer, though, and the game is far stronger abroad.
Why in the world would somebody who is playing with one of the
premier leagues down in Brazil or in Germany come to play in the
United States when their salary may shrink in fact,144 in terms of
endorsements and all that? Without that buzz, do you think that you
may not be attracting the talent which does then pull the fans like
that, and say, “Well, hey, you know what? I’m going to go watch the
German game today.”
MS. O’DONOGHUE: Well, I think that is certainly an issue when
you really have hard-core soccer fans who are very interested in the
European and the South American games. But part of MLS’s focus
has always been to develop American players, and it is doing so.
There are some really young players that it has worked with
144

See Sullivan, supra note 61, at 902 (MLS has a difficult time keeping players because
they do not pay as much as European soccer teams even if the European soccer team is in a
second- or third-division league).
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extensively, and it also has a specific program, Project Forty, which
develops young players.145
You are right, though. You recognize a key issue. There are
limited funds and you cannot go out and afford every star player.
Even if you only want a limited number of those high-caliber
European players or South American players, you cannot afford all
of them. In fact, probably the costliest of the costliest you cannot
afford at all. So you have to make those business judgments about
where you are going to spend your money.
QUESTIONER: I have a follow-up. Even if you take the
developmental nature of American soccer, why do you end up with
the dynamics where you have millions of American kids playing
soccer,146 but at some point in time when they reach a level of talent
at a little bit older age, a bunch of them switch over to other more
lucrative sports? So you may have fantastic athletes who at the high
school level all of a sudden start to play basketball or football.
And also, if you look at the American stars that have developed,
they have not developed through the American competition. They
are predominantly stars who have developed in the international
competition as well as the United States such as Cobi Jones,147 and
Alexi Lalas.148
MS. O’DONOGHUE: Well, if you look at Cobi and Alexi, those
are two players who predate MLS, so they certainly started to
develop before MLS was around, and they are definitely a product of
being part of the national team.
145
Project Forty is a developmental program funded by MLS to develop players selected
by teams through the MLS draft, or if signed after the draft, through a lottery system. See
Kevin Coleman, Trade Winds Blow Through MLS, Too: Single-Entity Structure Doesn’t
Hinder Movement, DENVER POST, July 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 6756205.
146
According to the Soccer Industry Council of America, the number of youths (under
nineteen years old) registered to play is 3.6 million, a figure that has grown at a rate of
eight-to-ten percent annually between 1990 and 2000. See Haya El Nasser, Commotion
Kicking Up Over Space for Soccer, USA TODAY, June 16, 1999, at 17A, available at 1999
WL 6845590.
147
See supra note 140.
148
For a brief biography of Lalas, see http://www.lagalaxy.com/roster/alexilalas.html
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
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But if you are talking about the kids right now that are twelve,
thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, I think that is where MLS’s real
opportunity is. By demonstrating to them that, “We now have a
place for you to play, so we are encouraging you stick with soccer;
sure, play your other sports, but now you have a place to come to,
instead of abandoning the sport or thinking ‘Okay, I am going to do
my best, but then I will go play overseas,’” MLS is making every
effort to hold on to the talented American players.
By the same token, there are those players who it is simply not in a
position to get at all, the younger stars on the national team who
bypass MLS altogether and simply go straight to Europe. It is a
matter of getting the League more on par with the European
competition. That is coming. It is going to take a little while.
But I think certainly the youth concentration and focusing on
making an effort to tell those players, “Develop, we have an interest
in you, we have a place for you,” is going to be turning around in a
couple of years. You know, Bobby Convey, he is a great example.
If you take an interest in a younger kid who is obviously very
talented and make it clear that he will have a place to play, you have
a good shot of not losing him.
MR. KESSLER: Virtually every MLS player you could mention
who anybody would have heard of in the United States as a famous
U.S. player has been developed by the national team—where there
is, by the way, a sense of individual player identity, an organization
which develops and promotes players and people get interested in
them. You cannot name an MLS player who has developed or
become known just for being an MLS player. They are all from
somewhere else. That is the problem.
QUESTIONER: Josh Wolff.149
MS. O’DONOGHUE: Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Josh Wolff made his splash at the Olympics. He
is totally American.
149
For a brief biography of Wolff, see http://www.mlsnet.com/bios/josh_wolff.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2002).
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MR. KESSLER: Where did he make a splash?
QUESTIONER: At the Olympics.
MR. KESSLER: Yes. And how did he become known? In the
Olympics, right?
QUESTIONER: But how did he develop?
MS. O’DONOGHUE: How did he develop? In MLS.
MR. KESSLER: I am not saying you cannot develop your soccer
skills in the MLS single-entity structure. There is a difference
between becoming a skilled player and becoming a marketable
player that will attract fans in this country on any kind of base broad
enough that many people will know who Josh Wolff is. In this room,
it is probably only a minority who ever heard of Josh Wolff, as
would be the case throughout the country.
But the point is you have got to have a structure where players are
promoted. One of the brilliant things that David Stern recognized a
long time ago is that the players are the game. When the players
became the focus of the NBA’s marketing and the teams’ individual
promotions the NBA took off as an enterprise. That is what, for
better or worse, American fans identify with—people, human beings
and individuality.
It will be interesting to see what happens with women’s soccer,
because in women’s soccer, you have a group of people who are
relatively well known from the national team and from the World
Cup, and they are going to be put into a single-entity League again.
We will see what happens. It will be very interesting to see whether
the league structure enhances their appeal or diminishes their appeal.
I am interested to see that.
MR. EDEL: And on that note, I want to thank you all for your
participation. I know I speak on behalf of everybody here when I say
that we all found it to be very stimulating.

